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In this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the influence of the 
possibility to make non-binding announcements on investment behaviour in public goods 
settings. Our models build on the idea that voluntary contributions to the supply of a public 
good might be motivated by some form of joy of giving. We show that the possibility to make 
non-binding announcements has a positive effect on cooperative behaviour, especially if 
individual announcements and factual investments are communicated to the players after each 
round. We also show that this result holds true even though the players have an incentive to 
overstate their true degrees of cooperativeness. Altogether, our theoretical considerations 
point in the direction that revealing as much information on individual intentions and factual 
behaviour as possible enhances cooperative behaviour. These conclusions are broadly 
confirmed by the results of a series of classroom experiments we present. 
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1. Introduction
A pure public good is characterized by non-rivalry in consumption and the impossibility
or ineciency of excluding others from its consumption, once it has been supplied. Stan-
dard public nance theory suggests that, due to the non-excludability property, a pure
public good will not be privately supplied since it is rational to make use of the free-
rider option. The correction of this sort of market failure is one of the basic normative
justications for government activity. However, some doubts have been raised as to how
far the supply of public goods by the government is an optimal solution. It is well known
that bureaucracies are subject to x-ineciencies. Besides, it is far from easy to uncover
the public's preferences on the optimal supply of public goods. Even if various methods
of revealing the public's preferences have been proposed and discussed, most of them are
quite complicated to implement in practice.
When experimental economics started to evolve in the early 1980s the standard the-
ory of public goods was soon subject to experimental studies. Early studies on public
goods experiments found that people exhibit signicant patterns of cooperative behaviour
and thereby contradict the standard theory. This initiated extensive research on the
determinants of cooperation in public goods experiments, which is partly theoretical but
mostly experimental in nature. Several motives for cooperation have been proposed and
discussed.1 In the light of the experimental results, the question is raised as to how far
the pessimistic view of standard theory, according to which public goods will not be
supplied on a private basis, holds true. Moreover, considerable experimental attempts
have been made to investigate the means by which cooperation can be further enhanced
(for a survey see Ledyard, 1995).
Signicant experimental eorts have been made to study the eects of communication
on cooperative behaviour. In experiments conducted by Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985),
Isaac and Walker (1988) and Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003), pre-experimental
communication increased cooperative behaviour { at least if participants were permitted
1 We discuss alternative motives for cooperation in more detail in the second section.The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments 3
to talk about the game explicitly. Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003) show the success
of coordination eorts to depend signicantly on the communication media used. Wilson
and Sell (1997) and Berlemann (2003) study the eect of the possibility to make non-
binding announcements and nd that the overall degree of cooperation increased in
comparison to the case in which no signalling mechanism was available. However, due
to the fact that most previous work on the eects of communication on cooperation in
public goods settings is more or less experimental in nature, these eects are still not
well understood.2
This paper aims at contributing to the eorts of understanding the eects of communi-
cation on cooperative behaviour by using experimental methods to test formally deduced
hypotheses. Relying on Andreoni's (1990) joy of giving argument, we outline a simple
theoretical model explaining why rationally acting individuals cooperate in a standard
public goods experiment. We then study how the introduction of a strictly limited form
of communication inuences individual behavior. We therefore extend the basic model
for the possibility to make non-binding announcements on future behaviour. It is shown
that this form of communication can be supposed to stimulate cooperative behaviour
even when there is only aggregate information on cooperation behaviour. However, when
information on individual behaviour is revealed, incentives for cooperative behaviour are
further increased.
We also report the results of a series of classroom experiments on public goods con-
ducted at Dresden University of Technology in spring 2003. The experimental results
broadly conrm our theoretical considerations. While cooperative behaviour remains
almost unaected by non-binding announcements under a low information level, co-
operation increases signicantly when information on individual behaviour is available.
Interestingly enough this holds true although the signalling mechanism is often used for
cheating purposes. However, the degree of cheating is signicantly lower when information
on individual behaviour is available.
2 Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003), p. 1.4 The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments
2. The model
In the following we rst present a simple theoretical framework of a standard public
goods experiment in which rational individuals choose a signicantly positive investment
into the public good. Building up on this basic model we then present three variations
of the model with dierent activity spaces and information levels.
2.1. The standard public goods setting
The standard public goods setting is a nitely repeated game. Due to the nite time
horizon of the interaction problem, it can be solved via backward induction. Since there
is no room for reputation building in this framework, the interaction problem is the same
in each single round. For reasons of simplicity we can therefore suppress time indices in
the following.
We assume all individuals (i = 1;:::;n) to have the same endowment of wi that can
be either invested in a private (xi) or a public good (gi):
wi = xi + gi: (1)
With n being the number of individuals in the economy and G i the contribution of all




gi = gi + G i: (2)
Monetary utility received from consumption of the two types of goods can be specied
by the following individual payo function:
Pi =   xi +   G (3)
with  and  being the marginal returns to the private and public good. Due to the
standard assumption  > , the dominant strategy is to invest the full endowment into
the private good in all rounds { at least when individuals are exclusively interested in
maximizing their individual monetary payos.
Previous experimental research has shown that in fact individuals invest a signicant
part of their endowment in the public good (Ledyard, 1995). Several motives for thisThe Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments 5
phenomenon have been proposed and discussed, such as the relative payo position
of individuals (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), cooperative gain
seeking (Brandts and Schram, 1996) and dierent forms of reciprocity (Rabin, 1993;
Falk and Fischbacher, 2000). However, we follow Andreoni (1990) in suggesting that
the underlying motivation of cooperative behaviour is some form of impure altruism.
According to this view individual utility does not exclusively depend on the consumption
of the private and the public good but also on the donations to the public good. Thus,
the act of giving itself increases individual utility. Moreover Andreoni and Petrie (2004)
argue that individual utility might also depend on the degree of observability of the act
of giving. In the following we use the term \joy of giving" to illustrate this phenomenon,
which is motivated by the purely egoistic warm glow resulting from making donations.
The joy of giving is thus a function S = S(gi).3
Furthermore, we allow a limited form of communication. In order to do so we assume
that individuals can announce how much they intend to invest into the public good.
Therefore we model the decision making process in general as a two-stage game. First,
individuals announce their intended investment to the public good. After that they decide
on their factual contributions.
Let ^ gi be the individual announcement of individual i. The group announcement ^ G
can then be written as the sum of announcements of individual i (^ gi) and all individuals




^ gi = ^ gi + ^ G i: (4)
We assume individual announcements to be non-binding. Moreover, deviations from an-
nouncements have no direct impact on the individual payos. Nevertheless, it is somewhat
likely that even non-binding announcements have an impact on general utility. There are
two additional eects that have to be taken into account.
3 Since we argued earlier that observability plays a decisive role for the evolvement of the joy of giving
it seems to be appropriate to assume that each individual covers an equal part of the aggregate joy of




. In this case, each
individual is treated as it would be an average contributor.6 The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments
A rst eect is directly related to Andreoni's (1990) joy of giving argument. Whenever
such a joy of giving exists, it is straightforward to assume that the announcement of a
donation itself also increases utility. To illustrate this argument imagine a benefactor who
is willing to make a donation to nance a public park. It is reasonable to expect that the
benefactor's utility rises when the park is opened and he is ocially cheered by ocials
and the press. However, the benefactor's utility also increases when the plan to construct
such a park is publicly announced. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that there is a \joy
of announcement" besides the joy of giving. We capture the joy of announcement by the
function J = J(^ gi).4
A second eect of the announcements on general utility results from the possibility
that the player does not stick to his or her previous announcement. For example, the
benefactor might decide not to construct the park at all or to contribute less funds than
previously announced. In this case he would have to suer from some form of social
ostracism creating disutility for him.5 With A being the disutility function, we have
A = A(gi   ^ gi).6
Altogether, preferences are represented by the general utility function:
Ui = Ui

xi;G;S(G;n);J( ^ G;n);A(G; ^ G;n)

: (5)
In order to be able to calculate explicit solutions we assume in the following the joy of giv-
ing and the joy of announcement to be linear-quadratic functions of individual donations
and announcements, thereby restraining the analysis to the part of the utility function
where the marginal utility is non-negative. The disutility from cheating is assumed to be a
quadratic function of the dierence between announced and factual investments into the
4 Analogously to the case of unobservable individual contributions the aggregate joy of announcement
has to distributed equally between the n individuals whenever individual announcements remain private






5 A dierent strand of the literature engages in studying the eects of dierent pecuniary punishment
mechanisms, cf. Fehr and Gchter (2000).
6 Whenever there is no individual information on announcements and investments only aggregate
dishonesty is revealed ex post. Again, the disutility resulting from aggregate cheating has to be borne
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public good. The intuition for this assumption is that large deviations from announced
values are likely to induce more disutility than small ones.7
2.2. Model I: No announcements possible
In the rst model (\model I") we study the case where there is no possibility to make
announcements. Therefore, individuals have no possibility to signal their cooperation.
Consequently, they have no joy of announcement and there is also no disutility from social
ostracism. Calculating the optimal investment in the public good is straightforward in
this case. Using the payo function and the constraints we can express individual utility
as:











with a and b being parameters of the linear-quadratic utility function of the joy of giving.
Maximization of Ui with respect to gi and assuming identical individuals, i.e. G = ngi,
yields the optimal contribution to the public good:
g




It is easy to see that the model predicts a positive contribution to the public good, given
a > n  (   ) holds true.
2.3. Model II: Announcements under a low information level
In the second model (\model II") individuals are now able to announce their intended
contribution to the public good. As expressed earlier, individuals make non-binding
announcements. We further assume that individual announcements remain private in-
formation. Only the sum of announcements is communicated to the group before the
individuals make their factual investment decisions. Again individual investment decisions
remain private information; the individuals are informed about the sum of investments
7 Due to the quadratic disutility function exaggerations of the true degree of cooperativeness are
penalized in the same way as understatements. However, the results derived throughout this paper remain
unchanged when only overstatements are penalised.8 The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments
into the public good only ex post. Therefore, we end up with the following utility function
for player i:





























with c being a scaling parameter allowing the joy of giving and the joy of announcement
to dier numerically. In order to identify the optimal announcement and the optimal
investment decision, we make use of the backward induction method. At the last stage,
individual i chooses gi given his previously made announcement ^ gi. Substituting player i's
reaction function for gi into the utility function and maximizing with respect to ^ gi yields
a reaction function for optimal announcements on alternative subsequent investment
decisions. Assuming identical individuals, we end up with two independent equations de-
termining the two variables g
i and ^ g




(   )  n





while the optimal contribution to the public good is:
g
i2 =
(   )  n(bc + 1)





Altogether, model II allows us to deduce two testable hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS 1. Individual contributions to the public good in model II are higher than
in model I: g
i2 > g
i1.




2.4. Model III: Announcements under a high information level
In model III the sequence of actions is as in model II. Unlike model II, we now assume
that individuals are supplied with full information on individual announcements andThe Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments 9
investments at the end of the last stage of each round. However, after making their
announcements individuals still only get information on the sum of announcements.
In contrast to model II, it is now possible to uncover who stuck to his announcements
and who did not, soon after the factual investment decisions have been made. Thus,
individuals now have to cover the full consequences of their behaviour when deciding to
deviate from their announcements. However, at the time when the announcements are
made and the joy of announcements accrues they are private information. The utility
function is therefore:
Ui =   (wi   gi) +   (gi + G i) +











^ gi + ^ G i
n
!23
5   (gi   ^ gi)
2 : (11)
Solving for optimal investments and announcements under the assumption of symmetry
leads to the optimal announcement:
^ g
i3 =
(   )  n





and the optimal investment into the public good:
g
i3 =
(   )  (bc + n)





Three testable hypotheses can be derived from model III.








HYPOTHESIS 5. The degree of cheating in model II is higher than in model III:
^ g
i2   g
i2 > ^ g
i3   g
i3.10 The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments
3. Experimental evidence
In this section we report the results of a small series of classroom experiments we con-
ducted in order to test the implications from the three models described and analysed
in the previous section. Since the experiments are naturally quite similar in their basic
setups we rst explain their common features. We then turn to a presentation of the
results of the three dierent treatments we conducted.
3.1. Basic setup
Our data comes from non-computerized classroom experiments with 60 subjects in 12
ve-person groups. We conducted three dierent treatments referring to the three models
presented in the previous section and repeated each session three times. Each group
took part in one session of the experiments with each session consisting of 10 rounds.
The participants were recruited by students of Dresden University of Technology. Most
of them (but not all) were students themselves. None of them had taken part in an
economics experiment before. Participants were randomly assigned in groups of 5. The
experiments were run at Dresden University of Technology in spring 2003.
Upon arrival participants were placed at dierent desks in the same room without
the possibility of observing the others' actions. Any form of uncontrolled communication
during the experimental session was made impossible. The players were asked to read
through the written instructions.8 Afterwards each participant had the possibility to ask
questions. These were answered privately by the experimenter. During the experiment no
additional questions were answered. Whenever the students had to act, for instance when
revealing their strategies for a certain round, they had to ll out prepared forms that
were collected by the experimenter after completion. Participants also had the possibility
of writing down the history of the game for their own information. All participants were
paid in cash directly after the sessions.
8 Translated versions of the instructions are presented in the appendix.The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments 11
The basic setup of all treatments was as follows: in each of the ten rounds the partici-
pants obtained an endowment of 10 tokens which could be either invested into a private
or a public good. Each token invested into the private good yielded a private payo of
4 cents. Each token invested into the public good led to a payo of 2 cents for each of
the 5 participants involved in the session. Thus, the individual payo of participant i in
round r was




with xi;r and gi;r being the tokens participant i invested in the private respectively the
public good.
The average payo of the involved 60 players was 6.65 euro (more detailed information
on the payos is given in table I). No session lasted longer than 30 minutes.
Table I. Payos.
Treatment I Treatment II Treatment III All Treatments
Average payo 6.57 6.51 6.86 6.65
Minimum payo 5.44 5.08 4.56 4.56
Maximum payo 8.44 8.42 9.16 9.16
Standard deviation 0.66 0.94 0.99 0.89
3.2. Treatment I
In his survey of evidence of standard public goods experiments Ledyard (1995, p. 121)
reports some stylized facts on players' behaviour. One of the most important ndings
is that in one-shot as well as in nitely repeated public goods experiments, participants
tend to show signicantly positive cooperative behaviour but contribute less than Pareto-
ecient to the public good. This stylized fact is in line with the theoretical models
(relevant here: model I) we outlined in the previous section.
In fact, in all four sessions of treatment I there is a signicant amount of cooperation
(see gure 1). The average contribution to the public good was 4.29 tokens per round12 The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments
and subject. In only 12.5 percent (N = 200) of all cases the players chose to be free riders
and to invest no single token in the public good. Thus, this stylized fact is adequately































GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP4
Figure 1. Average contributions to public good in treatment I per group.
There are some further stylized facts that could be observed in standard public goods
experiments, e.g. that contributions to the public good decline in the course of nitely
repeated games. Often the investments in the public good decline sharply in the last round
of the experiment (\last round eect"). However, even in the last round, the investments
in the public good are signicantly dierent from zero. While these stylized facts cannot
be explained by our theoretical model I, it nevertheless seems to be appropriate to test
for these issues since treatment I is intended to serve as a reference scenario. In order
to be suitable in this respect, the four sessions of treatment I should coincide with all
stylized facts.
Let us rst focus on the negative round trend. In fact, contributions to the public
good seem to decrease over time. However, in order to detect regularities in the data and
study individual investment behaviour we have to apply appropriate empirical methods.
Aggregation of individual behaviour is obviously inappropriate when studying individual
investment behaviour. Since we focus on individual investment behaviour here, we useThe Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments 13
panel regression methods to evaluate the data for a negative round trend. Most theories
trying to explain cooperative behaviour postulate the existence of dierent types of in-
dividuals (Brosig, 2002, p. 276). It is thus highly questionable whether panel regressions
with common intercepts are appropriate to make inferences on individual behaviour.
These regressions typically have low explanatory power.9 We therefore apply xed eects
models to the data, allowing for an individual intercept for every single player rather
than a common intercept.10 In order to test for a round trend in the data, we run the
following xed eects panel regression (OLS method):
gi;r = ci +   r + i;r: (15)
The results, which are reported in table II,11 indicate a signicant round trend in treat-
ment I. Thus, participants in treatment I signicantly decreased their investment into
the public good in the course of the game.
Table II. Round trend in treatment I.
 T-value Signicance r
2
Treatment I -0.10 -1.69 p < 0:10 0.33
We also tested for a last round eect by comparing the investments in round 10 with
the investments in the rounds before. The average investment in round 10 (3.50) was
0.88 smaller than the average investments in rounds 1-9 (4.38), a Mann-Whitney rank-
sum-test reveals that this dierence is signicant (one sided) at the 90-percent condence
level.
Altogether, the empirical ndings underline that treatment I reproduces the stylized
facts of standard public goods experiments mentioned earlier quite well. Thus, usage of
the results of treatment I as reference scenario seems to be appropriate.
9 See e.g. the study by Wilson and Sell (1997).
10 Due to our relatively scarce number of observations per treatment, we do not run random models as
is done e.g. in Neugebauer and Perote (2002).
11 We do not report the xed eects.14 The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments
3.3. Treatment II
In treatment II we changed the design of the standard experiment according to model
II. All participants were asked in every single round to announce how many tokens they
intend to invest into the public good. The individual announcements were added up and
were publicly announced. However, the results of the individual announcements were





















































TREATMENT I TREATMENT II
Figure 2. Average contributions to public good in treatment I and II.
Figure 2, which shows the average contributions to the public good in treatment I and
in treatment II, indicates that there is no signicant dierence of cooperative behaviour
between the two treatments. To test for hypothesis 1 formally, we compare individual
contributions to the public good in treatment I and II (average contribution treatment
I: 4.29; average contribution treatment II: 4.19). A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test reveals
that the dierence is not signicant on conventional condence levels. Thus, we nd no
supporting evidence for hypothesis 1.12
12 However, Berlemann (2003) conducted an experiment with exactly the same setting. In contrast to
our results he nds a signicantly positive eect of the possibility to make non-binding announcementsThe Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments 15
According to hypothesis 2 we should nd, that the players overstate their factual
degrees of cooperation. In fact, the players announced an investment of 5.65 tokens in
the public good in treatment II while they only invested 4.19 tokens on average. Using
a (pairwise) Wilcoxon test this dierence is signicant on a 99-percent condence-level.
Thus, we nd empirical evidence in favour of hypothesis 2.
3.4. Treatment III
The only dierence between treatment II and treatment III is that now the players
were publicly confronted with their behaviour after each round. After the factual invest-
ment decisions were made and the sum of investments were communicated, the players
were asked to turn around in order to guarantee intervisibility. Then the individual





















































TREATMENT I TREATMENT II TREATMENT III
Figure 3. Average contributions to public good in treatment I, II and III.
According to hypothesis 3, the degree of cooperation should increase in treatment III
with respect to treatments I and II. Figure 3 indicates that in fact average contributions
on future cooperative behaviour for the case that only aggregate announcements and behaviour can be
observed.16 The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments
to the public good were largest in treatment III. To test for this hypothesis formally
we compare the contributions to the public good in treatment III (average contribution:
4.77) with those of treatment II (average contribution: 4.19) and treatment I (average
contribution: 4.29). A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test indicates that contributions to the
public good were higher in treatment III than in treatment I and II on a 99-percent
condence level. Thus, we nd evidence in favour of hypothesis 3.
Moreover, participants in treatment III should still overstate their investments into the
public good (hypothesis 4). A (pairwise) Wilcoxon test indicates the dierence between
announcements (5.20) and factual investments in the public good (4.77) to be signicant
on a 99-percent condence level. Thus, we also nd supportive evidence for hypothesis 4.
This is a remarkable result since the players know that they can be perfectly monitored.
However, according to hypothesis 5, the degree of overstatement should be signicantly
lower in treatment III than in treatment II. A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test reveals
that the average degree of overstatement in treatment III (0.43) is in fact lower than in
treatment II (1.46) on a 99-percent condence level.
We should add that treatment III is quite similar to the experiments conducted and
reported by Wilson and Sell (1997). However, while Wilson and Sell made the individual
announcements public before the factual investment decision had to be made, we provided
this information not before the end of each round. In line with our ndings Wilson and
Sell nd cooperative behaviour to be higher when announcements are possible, at least
when information on past individual behaviour is available. Also in line with our results
Wilson and Sell nd the participants to overstate their true cooperativity.
4. Conclusions and outlook
Public goods experiments have a long tradition in both psychology and economics. One
of the most striking results of this line of research is that individuals are more cooperative
than \pure" theory initially predicted. Consequently, there is nowadays a large literature
concerned with the issue of which factors might account for the observed (at least initially)The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments 17
surprisingly high level of cooperation. However, a large part of this literature is purely
experimental in so far as the inuence of various treatment variables on cooperative
behaviour is analysed. Rarely do the related papers end up in testable theoretical models.
In this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the inuence of
the possibility of making non-binding announcements on future investment behaviour in
public goods settings. Our models build on the idea, rst expressed by Andreoni (1990),
that voluntary contributing to the supply of a public good might be motivated by some
form of joy of giving. We show that the possibility to make non-binding announcements
might have a positive eect on cooperative behaviour, especially if individual announce-
ments and factual investments are communicated to the players after each round. We also
prove this to be true although the players have an incentive to overstate their true degrees
of cooperativeness. Altogether, our theoretical considerations point in the direction that
revealing as much information on individual intentions and factual behaviour as possible
enhances cooperative behaviour. These results are broadly conrmed by a small series of
classroom experiments we reported in this paper.
Somewhat surprisingly, the inuence of strictly limited forms of communication such
as the possibility of making non-binding announcements on future cooperative behaviour
have rarely been studied, yet. This is true with respect to theoretical as well as experimen-
tal work. On the one hand, it would be an interesting line of research to study the extent
to which the presented theoretical results could be generalized. For example, it would be
interesting to extend the model for the cases where (i) even individual announcements are
made public before investment decisions are made and (ii) individual announcements are
public but individual donations remain private information. On the other hand, it seems
to be useful to spend some eort on substantiating our experimental results under more
repetitions, varying group sizes and for the two additional treatments just outlined.13
13 We should recall the fact that the presented models have clear implications for the inuence of the




Maximising utility (8) with respect to gi yields the reaction function for the optimal
contribution to the public good gi(^ gi;G i; ^ G i):






(gi + G i)  (b + 1)   (^ gi + ^ G i)

n2 : (16)
Substituting gi in the utility function (8) by (16) and maximising Ui with respect to ^ gi
leads to a term expressing individual announcement ^ gi in dependence on the announce-
ments of all individuals except i:
^ gi =
n2  (   )




  ^ G i: (17)
Assuming symmetry and therefore substituting G i by (n 1)gi and ^ G i by (n 1)^ gi
in (16) and (17) yields the optimal announcement (9). Furthermore, substituting ^ gi in
(16) by the optimal individual announcement (9) yields the optimal contribution to the
public good (10).
5.1.2. Model III
Proceedings in model III are similar to model II. Maximising utility (11) with respect to
gi yields the following reaction function:
gi =
(   ) + a + 2^ gi
2  (b + 1)
: (18)
In a next step, we substitute gi in the utility function (11) by (18). Maximising Ui with
respect to ^ gi yields the individual announcement:
^ gi =
n2  (   ) + na  (bc + c + n)   2 ^ G ibc  (b + 1)
2b  (bc + c + n2)
: (19)
Under the assumption of symmetry, (19) yields the optimal announcement (12). Substi-
tuting ^ gi in (18) by the optimal announcement (12) and solving for gi gives the optimal
contribution (13).The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments 19
5.2. Experimental instructions
The original instructions are in German. The rst part of the instructions were identical
for all three treatments. We report this part of the instructions under \General rules of
the game". The varying part of the instructions is reported under \Sequence of treatment
N" with N being the number of the treatment we refer to.
5.2.1. General rules of the game
Five players take part in the experiment. A total of 10 rounds are played. The same rules
apply to any round.
At the beginning of each round you receive 10 tokens. In each round you have to decide
how you want to use this endowment. There are two alternative investment possibilities: a
private investment and a public investment. You can choose between any whole-numbered
subdivision.
Each token you invest in the private good yields a private return of 4 cents. In con-
trast, all players participate of each token invested in the public good. The public good
investment generates a cash return of 2 cents per token for all participants. Therefore
the payo Pi of player i (per round r) can be calculated as:





  Pi: payo of player i
  xi;r: tokens of player i invested in the private good
  gi;r: tokens of player i invested in the public good
It is forbidden to communicate with the other participants throughout the whole exper-
iment. The money you have earned will be paid out immediately after the last round.
Your individual payment is not announced publicly.20 The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments
5.2.2. Sequence of treatment I
In each of the 10 rounds the game follows the same sequential procedure:
1. In each round every player writes on a prepared slip of paper the number of tokens
he is willing to invest in the private and in the public good.
2. The experimenter announces how many tokens the whole group has invested in the
public good. The individual investment decisions remain condential.
5.2.3. Sequence of treatment II
In each of the 10 rounds the game follows the same sequential procedure:
1. In each round every player writes on a prepared slip of paper the number of tokens
he intends to invest in the private and in the public good. This announcement is not
binding for following actions.
2. The experimenter announces how many tokens the whole group is intending to invest
in the public good. The individual investment intentions remain condential.
3. Every player writes on a prepared slip of paper the number of tokens he is willing to
invest in the private and in the public good.
4. The experimenter announces how many tokens the whole group has invested in the
public good. The individual investment decisions remain condential.
5.2.4. Sequence of treatment III
In each of the 10 rounds the game follows the same sequential procedure:
1. In each round every player writes on a prepared slip of paper the number of tokens
he intends to invest in the private and in the public good. This announcement is not
binding for following actions.
2. The experimenter announces how many tokens the whole group is intending to invest
in the public good. The individual investment intentions remain condential.The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments 21
3. Every player writes on a prepared slip of paper the number of tokens he is willing to
invest in the private and in the public good.
4. The experimenter announces how many tokens the whole group has invested in the
public good. He also announces the initial investment intention of each player as well
as his factual investment decision.
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